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Abstract 
The need for a comprehensive framework for the 
analysis of military system effectiveness is presented.  
Changes in the world’s economy and its effect on decision 
making is discussed, as well as the three primary ways 
decision makers use information: resource allocation, 
requirements definition, and trade studies between system 
components.  “System” and “system effectiveness” are 
clearly defined.  The idea of a system of systems 
formulation for military system effectiveness analysis is 
presented, discussing the need to expand the consideration 
of the system from the vehicle (engineering) level to the 
theater or campaign level.  The use of probability theory as 
part of the methodology is defended.  Finally, an intuitive 
overview of the proposed methodology is presented, in a 
step by step manner.  The methodology is called POSSEM 
(PrObabilistic System of Systems Effectiveness 
Methodology).   
Introduction 
Assessing the success and effectiveness of today’s 
complex systems becomes an increasingly challenging 
problem.  Demands for increased performance, lower 
system life cycle costs, longer operating capacities and 
improved productivity and efficiency must be balanced 
against limited resources, scant and sometimes unknown 
data, the identification and resolution of conflicts and 
problems, and resource allocation1.  Consideration of these 
tradeoffs dictates the need for an integrated and systematic 
methodology that can identify potential problem areas and 
assess system effectiveness during all phases of the system’s 
life cycle.  This analytical framework must also support 
decision-making between alternatives and options while 
assessing the consequences of such decisions. 
In the current world military environment, system 
effectiveness takes on a new meaning.  In the past, military 
aircraft design has been characterized by an emphasis to 
design for optimum performance.  Aircraft success was 
defined in terms of the aircraft’s ability to perform at least 
as well as the requirements to which it was designed, 
effectively ignoring adaptability to rapidly changing threat 
environments.  Performance was characterized by such 
attributes as speed, payload capacity, etc.  Recent 
imperatives, however, have shifted the emphasis from 
performance to overall system effectiveness as a key 
measure of merit for the aircraft.  Today, system 
effectiveness must not focus only on the aircraft’s 
performance, but instead on its ability to satisfactorily 
complete its mission, against a wide variety of threats and 
situations, at an affordable life cycle cost. 
Need for a Military System Effectiveness Framework 
The Changing Economy and its Effect on Decisions Making 
In recent years, the world has been changing at a 
remarkable pace.  A revolutionary new economy has risen.  
This economy is based on knowledge rather than 
conventional raw materials and physical labor2.  With this 
new economy comes new emphasis on technology and its 
impact, especially in the warfighting environment.  Almost 
all of the world’s countries spend a significant amount of 
their budget on the research, development and procurement 
of increasingly sophisticated weapons and warfare 
technologies3.  This is necessary because countries need to 
maintain or enhance their military capabilities in order to 
maintain their supremacy over their adversaries.  In 
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addition, strong and capable military capabilities serve as a 
deterrent to other countries who might otherwise turn 
aggressive.  However, the high cost of maintaining these 
capabilities must be balanced against limited resources.  
Former U.S. Secretary of State Dick Cheney is credited with 
the statement “budget drives strategy, strategy doesn’t drive 
budget”2.  Military decision makers need to understand and 
assess the benefits and consequences of their decisions in 
order to make cost efficient, timely, and successful choices. 
Along with changes in the world’s economy come 
changes in the way war is fought.  Substantial progress has 
been made in both weapon lethality and military technology.  
In addition, the battlefield of today has become increasingly 
complex, with interactions and their consequences 
becoming more and more difficult to isolate and understand.  
Because of the rapid advance of these developments, the 
decision makers are often left with ambiguous information 
and relatively short time spans to conduct analysis.  Often, 
these changes occur so rapidly that previous analysis is 
rendered obsolete.  For example, an aircraft that is designed 
to incorporate a certain avionics suite will often find that 
those avionics are obsolete by the time the aircraft comes 
into production.  The inherent uncertainty in this 
information makes definitive analysis difficult and implies 
that the use of probabilistic methods to understand and 
interpret this information is most appropriate.   
Overall, military decision makers need to be able to 
rapidly and efficiently answer questions such as those raised 
by Jaiswal3: 
What is the effectiveness of a weapon system or 
tactical plan in a plausible combat scenario? 
 
If the various factors influencing the performance 
of a system can be expressed qualitatively, can the 
performance be quantified? 
 
What force mix should be deployed for a specified 
mission? 
 
How many types of weapons should be deployed on 
various sites to provide cost-effective defense? 
 
How should weapons be assigned to targets to 
achieve a specified objective? 
 
Who is likely to win? 
  
These questions all point to the need for a military 
analysis capability that takes places at the theater level.  
Decision makers must be able to take rapidly changing 
information and technologies and combine them with 
projected situations in order to make decisions and 
understand their consequences. 
The Link to System Effectiveness 
What these decision makers are looking for is a 
quantification of system effectiveness.  In this case, the 
system of interest is the warfighting theater or campaign.  
The primary tool of today’s military decision makers is the 
campaign analysis environment.  These environments are 
modeling tools in the form of computer codes that model 
force-on-force engagements.  They are often quite complex 
and vary in their abilities to capture different aspects of the 
warfighting environment.  It is common for campaign 
analysis tools to have a detailed primary force models with 
only  rudimentary modeling of secondary forces.  For 
example, an Army code may have complex and 
sophisticated models for ground troops and support 
vehicles, but have a relatively simplistic air campaign 
model, or even no air campaign model at all.  True joint 
force models (models that capture all aspects of the 
warfighting environment with an equal level of analysis) are 
relatively few. 
Measures of Effectiveness 
The output of these tools are system effectiveness 
quantifiers, or Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs).  A 
measure of effectiveness (MOE) is a metric used to indicate 
the quality of a system1.  It may be a measurable quantity or 
calculated from other output parameters, or it can also take 
the form of a weighted combination of several other metrics.  
These metrics often consist of final calculations of damage 
done or resources used.  The following are some typical 
examples of campaign level MOEs: 
Number of Red aircraft shot down by Blue aircraft 
 
Number of damaged runways 
 
Distance in kilometers to halt Red advance 
 
Number of returning aircraft from a specific 
mission 
 
Each theater or campaign tool provides either its own 
set of hardwired MOEs or enough output data for the user to 
create his own system effectiveness metrics (or both).  It is 
through the shrewd choice of these metrics that the decision 
maker links the MOEs to the answers to questions such as 
those posed above. 
Use of System Effectiveness Metrics  
There are three primary ways that decision makers 
utilize system effectiveness information: resource 
allocation, requirements definition, and system component 
trade studies. 
Resource Allocation  -Most countries, when 
considering their military wants and needs, must deal with 
limited and often strict budgets.  Different government 
agencies, often with competing agendas, must all vie for a 
finite set of resources. In addition, these agencies will often 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
3 
make decisions in isolation, negating the chance for 
potentially mutually beneficial, and cost effective, decisions.  
Deciding how to allocate precious funds and resources, 
therefore, becomes a key issue.  System effectiveness 
concepts, when applied to the theater level, give the decision 
makers a way to link dollars to campaign level metrics.  
Comparisons may be made between dissimilar components 
of the system.  For example, there may be a need to assess 
whether additional resources should be supplied to a missile 
program or an aircraft program.  Straight one-on-one 
comparison of these two types of vehicles may be difficult 
because of their inherently different capabilities and 
performance.  But when placed in the context of the overall 
system (the warfighting environment), their individual (or 
even combined!) effect on the overall system effectiveness 
metrics can be assessed and appropriate decisions made. 
Requirements Definition -Another way system 
effectiveness metrics aid the decision maker is in the 
development of requirements for system components.  
Given the performance and capabilities of a system 
component, a campaign analysis tool can use that 
information to assess the effect of that component.  But this 
assessment capability may be turned around.  By varying 
the capabilities and performance characteristics of a notional 
system component, the optimal settings of these 
characteristics can be obtained that maximize system 
effectiveness.  An aircraft may be used as an example.  The 
question to be considered may be: what is the optimal 
aircraft strike speed needed to obtain a specific campaign 
objective?  A notional aircraft is modeled and the strike 
speed allowed to vary in the campaign analysis until the 
selected MOEs reach their optimal value(s).  Now the ideal 
strike speed is known for that class of vehicle.  This 
information can be used to define a design goal for future 
aircraft, or it may be used to assess the potential of 
modifying existing aircraft to achieve the new strike speed.  
In this way, complete requirements for new system 
components and new technologies may be developed.  
Finally, sensitivities of the values of specific requirements 
may be assessed.  This can be tremendously useful 
information: can a difficult requirement be relaxed, allowing 
cost savings or trade-offs between other characteristics, at a 
insignificant or acceptable reduction of overall system 
effectiveness? 
Trade Studies Between System Components -Finally, 
system effectiveness metrics can be used to assess the 
differing values and effects of system and sub-system 
components.  As mentioned earlier, it is often difficult to 
compare and contrast dissimilar sub-systems.  By placing 
those sub-systems in a larger framework (or system), the 
changes they affect in the top-level metrics may be observed 
and quantified.  For example, say it was of interest to 
consider which of two avionics packages would be better to 
use on an existing aircraft.  Analyzing changes in individual 
aircraft performance with each of the avionics packages 
could be difficult or indistinguishable.  But if the aircraft, 
with the avionics packages, were placed as system 
components in the theater, the effect of the avionics 
packages could be assessed.  In this case the avionics 
packages were allowed to fulfill their intended function 
within the larger system, and thus their effects more easily 
quantified. 
Lack of Overall System Effectiveness Methodology 
Given the power of a system effectiveness 
consideration of the modern warfighting environment, 
coupled with its usefulness in decision making, it is 
surprising to find a lack of cohesive and accepted 
methodologies used to address campaign level system 
effectiveness in the open literature.  To be true, there are a 
multitude of campaign level modeling tools, and the 
creation, use, and improvement of these tools is a 
flourishing endeavor4.  In addition, many decision makers 
and analysts use these tools in their own individual way.  
But finding information specifically detailing overall 
methodologies is difficult.  There are several possible 
reasons for this lack of obvious resources.  These reasons 
are detailed below. 
Semantics and Surplus of Synonyms 
In order to formulate a systems effectiveness 
framework, it is important to understand and clearly define 
the concepts of both “system” and “system effectiveness”.  
There is general agreement across fields and disciplines as 
to what constitutes a system.  The following definition is 
representative of this agreement, and is an acceptable 
definition for the developing framework: 
A system may be considered as constituting a 
nucleus of elements combined in such a manner as 
to accomplish a function in response to an 
identified need…A system must have a functional 
purpose, may include a mix of products and 
processes, and may be contained within some form 
of hierarchy…5 
 
However, the definitions of system effectiveness vary 
widely and are often application dependent.  Some examples 
that illustrate the diversity of these definitions include: 
 “The overall capability of a system to accomplish 
its intended mission”9 
 
 “The probability that the system can successfully 
meet an operational demand within a given time 
when operated under specified conditions”6 
 
 “A measure of the degree to which an item can be 
expected to achieve a set of specific mission 
requirements, and which may be expressed as a 
function of availability, dependability and 
capability” 7 
 
The authors of an annotated bibliography on system 
effectiveness models in 1980 concluded “A wide range of 
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definitions, and measures of system effectiveness are used 
without strong guiding logic”9. 
The words “system effectiveness” and the concept they 
represent first reared its head in the 1950s and 1960s8,9.  
However, these early formulations of system effectiveness 
were defined primarily as functions of the “-ilities”: 
reliability, availability, repairability, and maintainability.  
As such, the system effectiveness concept was applied to a 
single component or tool that itself was defined as the 
system.  For example, a missile would be defined as the 
system, and its system effectiveness assessed based on its 
availability, reliability, etc.  While this was a revolutionary 
concept at the time, these definitions are not as useful if the 
theater itself is considered the system.  Each component of 
the system may be assessed by its “-ilities” but these “-
ilities” are inadequate to serve solely as the theater level 
measures of effectiveness.  These pioneering definitions are 
somewhat still in use today8,1, making research specifically 
on campaign analysis system effectiveness difficult to 
isolate. 
Finally, “system effectiveness” holds different 
meanings for different communities and applications.  Some 
organizations tailor their definitions and methods to apply to 
very specific problems9.  A representative of the Potomac 
Institute for Policy Studies offers that the difficulty in 
finding information on system effectiveness lies in the broad 
connotations of the term: 
 “System Effectiveness has many different 
"branches",  primarily based upon the application 
area, e.g., military system effectiveness, policy 
analysis, information system effectiveness, 
reliability analysis, etc.  Within each application 
area there are multiple areas for consideration, 
e.g., in policy analysis there is the study of health 
care reform and its affect on society; the effect of 
transportation policies on a metropolitan area, 
etc.”10 
 
In addition, “system effectiveness” is often 
synonymous with other concepts, such as “operations 
research” and “systems analysis”.  However, even these 
other concepts umbrella a huge array of specific analysis 
approaches and definitions, and locating the unique niche of 
military system effectiveness is difficult.  For example, 
Reference 3 is a very recent (1997) state-of-the-art book on 
Military Operations Research.  This book uses the words 
“system effectiveness” only once in a brief, passing note.  
Similarly, Kececioglu8 in his 1995 book devotes only one 
small section to system effectiveness and defines it again in 
terms of  mission reliability, operational readiness, and 
design adequacy, which is again difficult to apply to the 
theater. 
A new, consistent definition for system effectiveness, 
therefore, is necessary and must be justified by identifying 
key elements crucial to a useful and informative definition.  
First, the term “effectiveness” implies that some sort of 
quantification needs to occur.  This quantification must 
necessarily be the result of some sort of systematic analysis 
of variables and metrics that represent the system 
performing its function.  In addition, in order to perform the 
quantification, an intended or expected effect needs to be 
identified in order to properly model the results of the 
system performance.  Combined, these concepts result in the 
following definition put forth by the author for use in 
formulating the framework for the probabilistic assessment 
of system effectiveness: 
System effectiveness is a quantification, 
represented by system level metrics, of the intended 
or expected effect of a system achieved through 
functional analysis. 
 
Another confusion arises when there is a lack of 
distinction between the modeling tools and the 
methodologies that use the tools.  Research that asks the 
question “What is the current state of the art in system 
effectiveness methodologies?” often turn up only the codes 
that can be used in such methods.  A true methodology 
should be a freestanding framework that is relatively 
independent of the tools it utilizes.  As the tools improve in 
fidelity, they should be able to be substituted into the 
methodology with little or no interruption.  Because the 
answer to this question usually results in a listing of 
modeling codes rather than methods or frameworks, an 
inherent lack of such methodologies is indicated. 
Difficulty Accessing Government and Classified 
Material 
Originally, system effectiveness studies were confined 
to military and space systems.  Agencies of the US 
Government, such as the Department of Defense and 
NASA, were the ultimate customers.  Because of this, the 
available literature on system effectiveness and the 
accompanying models were published primarily as technical 
reports, but rarely appear in widely published journals9.   
Today’s analysts appear to have new interest in system 
effectiveness studies using campaign modeling, especially 
in the area of technology infusions.  However, much of this 
work is classified or proprietary, limiting accessible 
publications and information.  Finally, those non-
government agencies that do make advances in theater 
modeling and system effectiveness may find it necessary to 
keep their in-house methods proprietary in order to retain 
their competitive edge. 
System of Systems Approach 
In order to successfully formulate a system 
effectiveness methodology, it is imperative to clearly define 
the system and its components.  The preceding sections 
discussed the benefits to the decision maker of considering 
system effectiveness at the theater or campaign level.  This 
endpoint represents an expanding progression of what is 
considered the system.  The resulting “system of systems” 
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formulation is a key concept in the development of the 
proposed methodology. 
A Shifting Paradigm 
In traditional design, most design decisions are made 
relatively early in the process, when the designer (or design 
team) has the least available knowledge about the proposed 
new system.  Design decisions lock in financial 
commitments, so the bulk of the cost is committed early in 
the design process.  As these decisions are made, design 
freedom falls off rapidly (Figure 1).  A paradigm shift, 
founded on the notion of Integrated Product and Process 
Design (IPPD), is now widely accepted.  IPPD seeks to 
bring more knowledge about the system life cycle to an 
earlier stage of the design process, in an attempt to delay 
cost commitments and also keep design freedom open11.  In 
other words, the designer needs to understand and quantify 
the implications of her/his decisions earlier in the design 
process in order to effectively reduce cost. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Paradigm Shift: Bringing Knowledge 
Forward in Design Process 
 
In addition, there is a parallel paradigm shift that 
considers what the measure of “goodness” is for a system.  
Traditionally, differing designs would be compared based 
on their performance.  For example, the questions that 
would mark the “goodness” of an aircraft would be of the 
sort: 
How fast does it fly? 
How far can it fly? 
How much payload can it support? 
 
All comparisons between competing designs would be 
based on performance.  The new paradigm shifts this 
emphasis not to individual system performance but to 
system effectiveness (Figure 2).  For an aircraft, this 
effectiveness would be illustrated by the answers to such 
questions as: 
What is the exchange ratio? 
What is the damage per sortie? 
What is the maintenance hours per flight hours 
cost? 
 
Together, these two paradigm shifts represent a 
broadening view of the design process, expanding the ideas 
and concepts from detailed particulars to a “big picture” 
representation.  This momentum will be carried forward, 
further expanding these basic concepts, to result in a system 
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paradigm shift
 
Figure 2 - Paradigm Shift: Performance Based Quality 
to Effectiveness 
The Theater as the System 
Using the traditional definitions, one can categorize an 
aerospace concept, such as an aircraft, as the system.  
Design and analysis conducted on the aircraft will result in 
system level Measures of Effectiveness (MoEs).  System 
effectiveness, therefore, becomes a function only of that 
aircraft’s design variables and parameters.  The relationship 
between the aircraft’s input design parameters and its 



































Figure 3 - The Aircraft as the System 
 
While this method of analysis can result in the design of 
a vehicle that is optimized to its own mission and 
performance requirements, the vehicle remains independent 
of its role for which it was created.  In other words, the 
aircraft is never placed in its correct context and evaluated 
as a system fulfilling its intended function.  In order to place 
the aircraft in its correct context, the system must be 
expanded and redefined.  No longer is the aircraft the sole 
system; rather let the aircraft’s intended environment 
become the system.  For a military aircraft, this new, larger 
system is the warfighting environment: the theater.  Thus, 
the theater (system) becomes a function of its components 
(systems in their own right, yet sub-systems here) and the 
overall formulation becomes a “system of systems”. 
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There is, however, a missing level in this formulation.  
The outputs of the vehicle level (performance parameters) 
do not usually map directly as inputs to theater level 
modeling codes.  Rather, the inputs at the theater level 
usually consist of probability of kill values, or effectiveness 
values that are the result of component vs. component 
encounters.  There must be an intermediary mapping that 
takes the output of the vehicle level as its inputs, and in turn 
generates outputs that serve as inputs to the theater level.  
This concept is illustrated in Figure 4.  With this 
formulation comes a necessary redefinition of output 
parameters, solely for clarity.  The output responses of all 
sublevel analysis will be called Measures of Performance 
(MoPs) and the output of the top level system (in this case, 
the theater) will be called Measures of Effectiveness 
(MoEs).  Thus, referring to Figure 4, theater level MoEs are 
functions of vectors of subsystem MoPs (at the engagement 
level) which are in turn functions of the requirements, 
design and economic variables, and technology factors 
associated with the vehicle level inputs. 
When the methodology is complete, there will exist a 
continuous mapping between vehicle level design 
parameters and theater level Measures of Effectiveness.  
Changes at the vehicle level can thus be propagated all the 
way to the theater level.  Instead of optimizing an aircraft, 
for example, to its own pre-defined performance and 
mission constraints, the aircraft can now be optimized to 
fulfill theater level goals and objectives.  In addition, as 
more system level components are treated as input variables, 
tradeoffs can be established not only at the individual 
component level, but across the components.  In other 
words, the methodology will allow tradeoffs between, say, 
the effectiveness of a surface-launched cruise missile 
compared to an aircraft carrying a specified weapons load.  
Tradeoffs could also be made between the number of system 
components needed: two of aircraft “A” could produce the 
same effectiveness of five of aircraft “B”, but at less cost.  
Thus, the methodology becomes a key device for design 
decisions as well as resource allocation. 
Finally, the completed methodology can be used to 
actually determine the mission and design requirements for 
the vehicles themselves that comprise the system.  By using 
the Measures of Effectiveness at the theater level as a 
measure of goodness, tradeoffs can be made between 
vehicle design and mission requirements.  These 
requirements, when optimized to maximize the overall 
effectiveness of the system, become the requirements to 
which the vehicles are then designed. 
System MoE = fn( MoP1, MoP2, MoP3, etc)


















































Figure 4 - System of Systems Formulation 
 
A note must be made at this point concerning system 
decomposition.  The first system to be put forth was the 
aircraft itself.  It becomes obvious, in the light of the 
previous discussion, that the aircraft itself is a system of 
systems.  The aircraft is made up of a variety of major 
components, which can be seen as sub-systems.  In turn, 
each of these subsystems can be seen to be functions of their 
components, so they, too, are each a system of systems.  
Going in the other direction, the engagement level can be 
seen as a function of not just one aircraft vs. aircraft 
scenario, but must be comprised of many differing 
engagements in order to generate a complete set of 
information for the next system in the hierarchy: the theater.  
System decomposition, therefore, can be understood to have 
a pyramid shape, with each level in the decomposition being 
subdivided into its components, which are in turn 
subdivided.  The question becomes, then, where does one 
stop?  How much subdividing is necessary, and how many 
levels are needed?  The answer to this depends on the 
definition of the problem that is being studied and the tools 
that are available. This leads to the idea of the “conceptual 
model”, the development of which is an important step in 
the proposed methodology.  It is up to the skill and 
experience of the designer or decision maker to accurately 
and adequately bound the problem and define the system 
and its components effectively. 
Mathematical Modeling 
Once the system and its components have been clearly 
identified, an analysis environment must be created.  The 
key word in the definition of system effectiveness is 
“quantification”.  In order for the decision maker or 
designer to analyze the system effectively, the results of the 
analysis must be presented as quantifiable metrics.  This 
involves restating a research goal or design decision into a 
question that can be answered quantitatively.  Dixon12 states 
this explicitly: “An engineering analyst must begin by 
defining quantitatively answerable questions”.  
Mathematical methods, thus, become primary tools in 
system analysis because of their ability to rapidly provide 
these calculable (quantifiable) metrics.   
In addition, mathematical modeling allows the user to 
understand and make informed decisions at various levels 
within the system hierarchy.  With the “system of systems” 
concept comes an appreciation of the potential complexities 
and interactions involved.  Mathematical modeling offers 
significant benefits: “There are many interrelated elements 
that must be integrated as a system and not treated on an 
individual basis.  The mathematical model makes it possible 
to deal with the problem as an entity and allows 
consideration of all major variables of the problems on a 
simultaneous basis11.” 
Use of Probability Theory 
The paradigm shift of Figure 1 makes the argument that 
bringing knowledge forward in time results in better 
decision making.  However, it must be recognized that this 
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knowledge has an associated uncertainty with it.  This lack 
of certain knowledge could be based on missing, 
unavailable, or incomplete information, the incorporation of 
a new technology as a function of its readiness level, or 
even an uncertainty in the modeling tools used in the 
analysis.  The question becomes how to accommodate this 
uncertainty into the mathematical modeling and subsequent 
analysis.  The answer to this is to incorporate basic 
probabilistic elements into both the modeling and the 
analysis, and, by extrapolation, the overall system 
effectiveness methodology. 
Understanding the sources of the uncertainty helps 
determine why a probabilistic approach is useful.  Referring 
back to the “system of systems” hierarchy, it is clear that 
each subsystem level will have its own inputs.  Perfect 
knowledge about these inputs is rare, and it is often that the 
designer or decision maker must make assumptions based 
on available data and personal experience.  Using 
probabilistic inputs would allow the user to account for 
variation in his assumptions.  Analysis based on these 
probabilistic inputs could provide useful information about 
the sensitivities of the inputs, which in turn could be 
translated into requirements definitions.  By allowing the 
inputs to vary, the designer or decision maker could play 
“what if” games, using the models as a computationally and 
economically inexpensive way to explore the boundaries of 
the problem.  And finally, variable inputs would allow an 
investigation of the robustness of a solution (i.e. that 
solution whose performance parameters are invariant or 
relatively invariant to changes in its environment). 
Another major source of uncertainty can be found when 
considering the incorporation of a new technology.  
Modeling current technologies is straightforward, with the 
performance parameters of that technology generally 
known.  However, current technologies may not be capable 
of meeting customer needs or design goals.  In addition, 
current technology may be obsolete by the time the system 
is implemented.  This necessitates a prediction capability 
concerning the impact of new technologies.  Performance of 
a new technology is a function of its readiness level, but that 
function may or may not be completely defined.  By 
modeling a new technology in a probabilistic fashion, one 
can explore various assumptions pertaining to the 
performance and the corresponding effects of that 
technology. 
Overall, the presence of uncertainty in most complex 
systems points to the use of probabilistic elements.  Coupled 
with a mathematical modeling capability, an analysis 
environment can be created for incorporation into a system 
of systems effectiveness methodology. 
Proposed Methodology: POSSEM 
All of the preceding concepts and ideas are now 
combined into one cohesive methodology.  This section will 
discuss, in a general and intuitive fashion, the proposed 
methodology.  Called the Probabilistic System of Systems 
Effectiveness Methodology, or POSSEM, the framework 
outlines a step by step process to assess the effectiveness of 
a complex military system.  The entire framework is shown 
in Figure 5, and each component of the process will be 
discussed in detail. 
Difference Between Analyst and Analysis Tool 
At this point an important distinction needs to be made 
between the role of the analyst and the role of the analysis 
tool.  The POSSEM framework is an analysis tool.  It does 
not conduct analysis. Rather, it provides a clear, concise 
path to follow to aid the analyst in their assessments.  Too 
often today modeling tools are confused with the actual 
analysis process.  Just because a tool has been created and 
validated does not mean that anyone who can operate the 
tool is automatically going to generate useful, correct, and 
pertinent analysis.  The tool can only be successfully 
operated by someone who is thoroughly familiar with the 
problem and has some understanding of both the inputs and 
the outputs used by the tool.  The important, implicit 
assumption in the POSSEM framework is that it is to be 
used by an appropriate analyst. 
Create the Conceptual Model 
The first step in the POSSEM process is the most 
crucial: the creation of the conceptual model.  As defined in 
Chapter III, the conceptual model is the “plan of attack” 
used towards solving a particular problem.  It is the 
necessary up front work that the analyst needs to do before 
even considering running a single computer code.  The 
conceptual model is a careful consideration of the problem 
at hand, and results in the identification of key elements that 
are subsequently used in POSSEM.  As part of POSSEM, 
the conceptual model is created by answering three key 
questions: 
What problem are we trying to solve? 
What level of detail do we need? 
What tools are needed and available? 
The first question, what problem are we trying to 
solve?, serves to aid the analyst in identifying the basic 
goals of the analysis.  Answers to this question provide 
information that aids in identifying what Measures of 
Effectiveness are needed, what input variables are 
appropriate, and, to some extent, what modeling tools may 
be necessary.  A clear understanding of what the analysis 
goals are is crucial to a successful analysis.   
The next question, what level of detail is needed?, is an 
often overlooked element.  Too many times the analyst will 
let the capability of the tools drive the analysis, rather than 
the other way around.  The analyst needs to decide, before 
conducting any code executions, how good is good enough.  
What level of fidelity on the answer is needed?  What basic 
assumptions can be made that simplify the problem without 
placing the analysis at risk?  Which components need to be 
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modeled in great detail and which can be modeled more 
coarsely?  The answers to this question will determine 
which types of codes and at what detail level are needed.  
The final question, what tools are needed and 
available?, serves to recognize that as much as we would 
like to stay philosophically pure, analysts do sometimes 
have limitations on their available resources.  A survey of 
appropriate modeling tools needs to be conducted, and the 
appropriate tools, at the appropriate level of detail, need to 
be selected.  If an appropriate tool does not exist that meets 
the pure requirements of the analyst, a less suitable tool may 
be substituted.  But this pre-analysis will allow the analyst 
to understand the limitations of their tool, and adjust their 
analysis accordingly. 
Once these three questions have been answered, the 
analyst will then have the resources and information to 
conduct the initial problem setup.  This involves 
establishing the baseline vehicles and technologies, 
determining the specific inputs and outputs of the problem, 
and defining the scenario most suitable for the investigation 
of the problem.  But, as shown in Figure 5, the answers to 
the questions and the establishment of the problem setup is 
an iterative process.  Tradeoffs must be conducted between 
the three questions and the resulting three areas of setup.  
For example, knowing what problem is trying to be solved 
keys directly into what level of detail is needed to solve that 
problem.  The level of detail needed may or may not be 
driven by what tools are available.  The scenario that is 
defined must include in its inputs and outputs those entities 
that are to be studied.   
A solid conceptual model creates a solid foundation for 
subsequent analysis.  It allows the analyst to more 
thoroughly understand the problem at hand, and provides 
crucial insight and information useful to the remainder of 
the analysis. 
Identify Key Decision Nodes 
The next step to POSSEM is to identify the key 
decision nodes.  This step works with the scenario defined 
during the creation of the conceptual model, and is used to 
help combat the human in the loop problem.  The goal is to 
retain the flexibility and uncertainty of having a human 
involved in the decision and assumption making process, 
yet create an environment in which the computer codes may 
be run quickly and efficiently.  To do this, the analyst 
conducts a pre-processing of the scenario/campaign.  Tree 
diagrams are constructed and used to identify the key 
decision nodes.  For a very complex scenario, probabilistic 
screening techniques, such as those discussed in Reference 
13,  may be employed to help identify which of the decision 
nodes contribute most to the variability of the response, and 
which can be set to their most likely value.   
Once the decision nodes have been identified, the 
analyst uses their skill and experience to assign probabilities 
to each path.  This completed environment will then be used 
as part of the full probabilistic environment. 
Create Linked Analysis Environment 
The creation of the modeling environment in which to 
conduct the analysis is the next step.  Using information 
generated in the conceptual model, modeling codes are 
selected that, together, will create an environment to which 
the answers to the problems posed in the conceptual model 
may be answered.  During this step, the concepts of both 
model abstraction and model integration must be applied.  
Starting first with model integration, models are selected 
that form a continuous modeling path through the 
continuum, from the engineering level to the campaign 
level.  Care must be taken to select the appropriate codes at 
the appropriate level of detail.  Software zooming may be 
necessary to isolate and highlight a particular effect.  Once 
the codes have been selected, the concept of model 
abstraction is applied.  Those codes and areas that may be 
replaced by metamodels, similar to techniques used in 
Reference 13, will be chosen in order to increase efficiency 
and runtime, with an acceptable loss of fidelity.   
The final step in the creation of the linked analysis 
environment is to link the various codes together in a 
computing environment.  This could take the form of scripts 
that take the outputs of one code and feed it into the other, 
or the creation of a graphical interface or shell that conducts 
all the necessary data transfer.  This step is not to be 
considered trivial by any means, and the successful creation 
of a linked analysis environment is a major achievement in 
the process. 
Create Full Probabilistic Methods 
Once the linked analysis environment has been created, 
it can be used to implement a full probabilistic environment. 
This involves applying the probabilistic methods described 
in Reference 13 to the linked analysis environment.  To this 
end, ranges are placed on the selected input variables, and a 
Design of Experiments is conducted.  Metamodels are 
created for those parts of the linked analysis environment 
identified in previous steps.  Intermediate prediction profiles 
may be created at each juncture point for analysis purposes.  
Distributions are also placed around key threat variables, to 
model a changing threat environment.  These distributions 
are carried throughout the entire analysis.  Finally, code runs 
are conducted around the decision points in the scenario. 
The results of the code runs conducted in this step will 
be a series of linked metamodels.  These metamodels are 
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CASE SREF SWEP TURBO R1 R2
1 -1 -1 -1 y1 y1
2 -1 -1 1 y2 y12
3 -1 1 -1 y3 y13
4 -1 1 1 y4 y14
5 1 -1 -1 y5 y15
6 1 -1 1 y6 y16
7 1 1 -1 y7 y17
8 1 1 1 y8 y18
Create Full Probabilistic Environment
Using Linked Analysis Environment
Responses =  fn (Theater Level  MoEs )
System  MoE  =  fn(MoP 1, MoP 2, etc)
MoP  = fn ( Xreq , Xdes , Xtech )
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Figure 5 – The POSSEM Flowchart 
 
Analysis 
The final step of POSSEM is to use the generated 
metamodels and data to conduct the analysis.  This is done 
by creating a spreadsheet environment that uses the 
metamodels to create analysis paths that link the outputs of 
one level of the continuum to the inputs of the next level.  In 
this way, there is a traceable computational path that links 
the final Measures of Effectiveness down through the 
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engineering level inputs.  At each point along the analysis 
path, wherever there were probabilistic inputs, the 
spreadsheet will allow those inputs to be changed (within 
their ranges of applicability) and the results updated in real 
time through the use of the metamodels.  This is the “Impact 
Dial” environment, and is a valuable tool for the analyst.  
With this tool the analyst can explore the impacts of various 
assumptions rapidly and efficiently.  The final goal of the 
method is for the analyst to use this information to answer 
the questions posed in the conceptual model, aiding in 
resource allocation, trade studies between system 
components, and requirements definitions. 
Summary and Future Work 
This paper was meant as an overview, discussing the 
need for a military system effectiveness framework.  In 
addition, a proposed methodology, POSSEM, was presented 
and discussed.  The development of POSSEM has been an 
ongoing project, and the interested reader is referred to the 
following papers.  The probabilistic methods used in 
POSSEM, as well as an overview of military modeling, is 
presented in Reference 14.  A theater level test case 
applying the probabilistic methods to only the theater level 
was completed in Reference 15.  This was done in order to 
identify any issues that might arise from such a probabilistic 
application.  Finally, Reference 16 illustrates a theater level 
test case involving adding survivability concepts to aircraft 
and assessing their impacts on theater level measures of 
effectiveness.  The first iteration of the POSSEM 
framework is presented.  These references are currently 
available for download at 
 http://www.asdl.gatech.edu/publications/index.html 
The next step in the research is to implement POSSEM 
completely, using a survivability test case.  Survivability 
concepts will be applied to an aircraft at the engineering 
level, and the effects of these changes will be propagated 
through to the theater level.  A complete linked analysis 
environment will be created and used for the study. 
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